Anarchism is a philosophy about how humans can benefit as members of society. At its core, it questions whether people have ever always been controlled. Max Stirner is a figure in the anarchist individualism part of the German romantic movement. He presents anarchism as a matter of identity, emphasizing extreme individualism and egoism. He is a community of free individuals working together to expand freedom for everyone.
To clarify, Stirner critiqued individualism within anarchism. He viewed state socialism as a central aspect of anarchism. In 1844, he wrote The Ego and Its Own, arguing against the state’s control over people. Stirner’s take on individualism within anarchism differs from other anarchist writings from the late 19th century.
Conversely, thinkers like Peter Kropotkin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and William Godwin tried to find a mystical basis for anarchism to protect people’s emotions. Stirner, however, had a unique perspective on anarchy that went against individualism. He held onto the idea of the ego as a crucial part of individuality. His approach has faced criticism from Hegelians and Marxists, positioning him as a counter to traditional individualism.
A segment of individualist political philosophy was dedicated to those who saw Stirner as a Hegelian illusion. Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hegel’s dialectical theories were used as a political instrument. Nonetheless, it is not easy, particularly given the distinctive Stirner national and political character. It is held by thinkers such as David McClelland.
Although Stirner is seen as a final Hegelian thinker, philosophers like Karl Löwith and Friedrich Engels acknowledged Stirner’s work, calling it an intellectual thought pinnacle.
The Ego and Its Own is a work of nihilism and existentialism. It evolves in accordance with independence and the post-left political agitations and presents a society with a picture of a clamorous study. Stirner’s views could be more organized, but they particularly fail in the very people who create chaos themselves. He limits humanism, the sphere of influence, and other such forces to the individual who is, however, not influenced by any trends.
Fighting for certain beliefs was not something that Stirner was. Still, he opposed abstraction and interestedness, particularly the state. The state is the enemy, causing people to forgo their lives. He considers all, from dignitaries to common citizens, as encumbered by the state in the end, which operates for money. He argued that the ruling class used property, work and power for enslavement of people’s clear-mindedness.
According to Stirner, anarchism and individualism depend on the state’s presence. He also disapproves of liberalism due to its weakness in combating state power, which in turn distorts the individual’s view and invents political citizenship. However, he suggests that these distortions are also present in liberalism and even more so in socialism. He says that every organism or system, including the government, must have a worthy element of existence; otherwise, it runs the being hollow and useless risk. For Stirner, self-notion is almost always tied to a societal notion that is organized politically in one way or another.
Let us examine Stirner’s then-emerging Western philosophy to assess his influence. He believed that Greek culture had been reinvented by the West, which had long since passed. He claimed that this was reasonable and served as the ancients’ compass. With respect to nature, they thought reason was the path to veracity. Nevertheless, ideals are about change and movement, indicating that veracity evolves.
This nature varies in the eyes of philosophers. Stirner betrayed a kind of hopelessness in the quest for the elusive. Hence, he considers trait deficiencies to be part of human nature. His outlook has diverged from the context that he was leading, and he has needed more faith. Within anarchism, Stirner typifies individualism as the vice of human character. He views moral values as the values of self-creation that carry no real weight. He calls this a foolish globe in the present-day world.
Stirner posits that once concepts become established as a divine or overarching idea about a person’s character and physical attributes, they become the basis for people’s customizations. Although he views the ego as some substance, he mocks the intrinsic regard for individuals and considers humanism a later development. Stirner disparages Kant’s esaping and considers it obvious that Kant’s natural reason is really about how one rationalizes away one’s desires. Kant states that reason progresses from sense perception to generate its content, thus leading to organized but boxed images, which become a problem for Stirner.
The modern way of living can be chaotic and meaningless, such that people feel unfounded reassurance and even unfounded optimism. Stirner comes against the concept of objective harmony, which he believes exists at the expense of a true individual. Moreover, Derrida observes that, to a certain degree, representation turns unique beings into tools. In contrast, he thinks that it is impossible to present any single interpretative framework of humanity that would do justice to the intricacies of every single individual. Therefore, he believes that general social regulations can serve more serious purposes.
Citizens cherish the expensive ones and are, to a great extent, obligated to emulate them to a slight degree. However, it actually changes how people see themselves. Foucault says that truth depends on the state, though he does not does not offer a solution. Stirner, on the other hand, thinks that that is too limited. He does not buy into the idea that the state gets to set customs, rules, and conventions. He examines how expectations in society weigh down people, indicating that such dictates.
For Stirner, the highest point of the Hegelian tradition has its faults. For him, the illusion of control is a way to explain the need for power over others. In simple terms, he did not enjoy being referred to as the last Hegelian. He liked to see himself as an anti-Hegel. Stirner was, in fact, the first post-structuralist thinker. It creates a problem for him, as it creates the need for such manipulation purposes. So, what does Stirner even think? Moreover, what do rights really mean if the state is treated like it has its own “body”?
The dominant idea of “truth” has basically suffocated critical movements in Western philosophy. While liberal humanism often ties violence to rights, it also raises questions about the beliefs wrapped up in the drive to feel something real when facing emptiness. This search puts the seeker in a mix of shared and personal language when standing up for something absolute.
Besides, it is still a body, and everything is accounted for it.
References
- Derrida, J. (1976). Of Grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Johns Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1967)
- Engels, F. (1975). Collected Works (Vol. 1–50). Lawrence and Wishart.
- Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Pantheon Books.
- Godwin, W. (1793). An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness. G. G. J. and J. Robinson.
- Kant, I. (1781). Critique of Pure Reason (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Kropotkin, P. (1902). Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. Heinemann.
- Löwith, K. (1964). From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought (D. E. Green, Trans.). Anchor Books.
- McClelland, D. (1961). The Achieving Society. Free Press.
- Proudhon, P.-J. (1840). What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Government (B. R. Tucker, Trans.). Humboldt Publishing Company.
- Stirner, M. (1844). The Ego and Its Own (S. T. Byington, Trans.). Rebel Press, 1993.