Presentism is the tendency to analyze historical figures, occurrences, or ideas using today’s standards and views. It usually leads to anachronistic decisions. For instance, past activities might be considered based on current ethical and artistic means rather than being apprehended in their chronological context. While presentism can highlight societal progress, it can also oversimplify history and ignore its complexities.
Take figures like Winston Churchill or Thomas Jefferson; people often reexamine them through the lens of modern ethics, especially concerning imperialism and slavery. Likewise, literature and films are sometimes criticized for outdated portrayals of gender, race, or morality, even though they reflect the norms of their time.
Unlike eternalism, which suggests that the past, present, and future all exist equally, presentism claims that only the present is real. Presentists notice time as active, just the present lives, while the past and future are either absent or just thoughts. This idea aligns with our instinctive sense of time, where the future has not occurred yet, and the past is born.
Eternalists, on the other hand, think in the “block universe” example, where time is a four-dimensional framework in which all points live equally. This idea is supported by physics, particularly Einstein’s theory of relativity, which states that time is relative rather than absolute, meaning different observers can experience different “presents.”
Presentist scholars argue that eternalism leads to determinism, raising doubts about free will and suggesting that the future is already set. Eternalists, however, criticize presentism for contradicting modern physics and for failing to explain how time actually “flows.”
Presentism aligns with how we naturally perceive time (where the past is gone, and the future is uncertain). In essence, we experience time as something that moves forward. Supporters of presentism believe that progress and change are fundamental aspects of time. If eternalism were true, change would be an illusion, and every moment would exist without true transformation. However, presentism allows reality to evolve and shift while maintaining the idea that time genuinely passes.
If eternalism were correct, things like extinct animals or historical events would still “exist” in some sense. However, presentists argue that it makes more sense to say those things do not exist rather than saying they exist in a different “temporal location.”
Furthermore, if only the present is accurate, then the future remains open and undetermined. Eternalism, on the other hand, implies that the future is already set in stone, which raises the idea that everything is predestined (challenging the notion of valid free will). By identifying best the present as valid, presentism suggests a better translucent, additional instinctive method to believe about truth, bypassing the intricacies of eternalism, which needs to account for an unlimited digit of past and future commodities.
For example, when we say that past events “have happened” and future events “have not happened yet,” we are basically reinforcing the idea that only the present is real. Since we make decisions based on the present rather than some fixed four-dimensional framework, presentism aligns with how we practically think about time.
According to Einstein’s particular relativity, simultaneity relies on the viewer’s edge of concern, representing that it is not final. What occurs at the exact moment for one viewer might not co-occur for another, moving at a separate rate. It means that there is no ubiquitous “now” supporting the view that just the present is true. Building on Einstein’s work, Hermann Minkowski introduced the concept of spacetime, arguing that space and time are fused into a single four-dimensional structure, where every moment in time exists equally in this “block universe.”
Presentist William Lane Craig suggests that if a preferred frame of reference exists, an absolute present might still be possible. However, since relativity does not provide empirical support for an objective present, most physicists reject this idea. They generally accept the block universe model. If eternalism is correct, presentism (since it assumes a fundamental difference between “now” and other points in time) cannot be accurate.
Physicist Paul Davies argues that rather than prioritizing the present, physics treats time as an extra dimension, making all events equally real. Kristie Miller adds that relativity shows how different observers experience time differently, making a single universal “now” impossible, one of the key reasons modern physics supports eternalism. However, there is no fundamental explanation for this in physics itself; instead, relativity’s mathematical equations treat time as a static dimension.
Huw Price takes a different stance, arguing that time flow is not a fundamental part of reality but rather an illusion created by human perception. It directly contradicts the presentist claim that only “now” is real. Some presentists try to reconcile their view with relativity by suggesting that only one moment is “lit up” as the present, though this idea is quite similar to eternalism. Others, like Craig, argue that an absolute but hidden frame of reference determines what “now” truly is.
However, if presentism is true and only the present exists, what makes it accurate to say that dinosaurs roamed the Earth millions of years ago? Presentists need to explain how such statements remain valid despite dinosaurs being extinct. If the past no longer exists, what guarantees that someone saying, “I graduated last year,” is telling the truth? They argue that present evidence supports these claims; since fossils exist “now,” it is accurate to say that dinosaurs once lived.
However, this approach struggles with events that left no physical evidence. This perspective is inspired by the ancient philosopher Lucretius, who argued that past-tense statements do not require a “truthmaker”; they are true simply because they describe what actually happened. For example, “Caesar was assassinated” is true because the event “did” occur, not because of anything happening right now. However, this raises a problem: if truth does not depend on the present, then truth itself starts to feel arbitrary, weakening its connection to reality.
According to some presentists, historical events exist in a non-physical way within reality’s structure. For example, saying that World War II “happened” can be supported by a collection of impersonal ideas, even without the war itself still existing. It acknowledges a past existence. Another approach is to argue that past-tense statements are accurate because past events have their tense-based truth. Saying “The Battle of Hastings happened in 1066” is true because the event really took place at a certain point in time. However, eternalists criticize this reasoning as circular.
Presentism also clashes with theories of personal identity, which often rely on continuity over time. If only the present is real, how can a person remain the “same” throughout their life? Conventional ideas about identity, such as psychological connectedness (Derek Parfit) or memory continuity (John Locke), assume there is a link between one’s past and present self. However, if the past does not exist, forming that connection becomes difficult.
It raises another issue: How does moral responsibility apply to past actions? Many ethical theories assume that people remain accountable for what they have done. However, if the past does not exist, concepts like responsibility, punishment, and guilt become more challenging to justify. Presentism also has ethical consequences, especially regarding our duties to future generations and how we deal with historical injustices.
If only the present is real, does it even make sense to say we have moral obligations to future generations who have yet to be born? Many ethical frameworks assume we “do” have duties toward them, but presentism challenges this by denying the existence of the future. It also complicates how we should respond to historical wrongs; why try to make amends for past injustices if the past “does not exist”?
Memory and historical knowledge shape the presentist perspective in terms of how society understands and interacts with history. Since presentism denies the existence of past events, our only way of engaging with the past is through memory. All we have are relics, historical documents, and cultural artifacts that serve as reminders of what came before.
Historical revisionism can also stem from presentism, linking it to historical presentism (the idea that the present always influences our understanding of the past). Supporters of this view argue that history is always a reconstruction based on current knowledge rather than a perfectly accurate representation of past events. In fact, many debates in metaphysics and physics are shaped by this very idea.
Time is dynamic and constantly changing. While this seems obvious, it contradicts contemporary physics. Einstein’s theories give weight to the opposite view, showing that simultaneity is relative and that different observers experience time differently. In the framework of relativity, the disagreement between presentism and eternalism appears irreconcilable with modern physics.
Sure, time can be seen as an extra dimension. However, the block universe model fits well with relativity. Presentism continues to divide philosophers; some defend it with updated arguments, while others challenge it with logic and science. Ned Markosian argues that presentism is the most natural way to think about time because it aligns with human experience and how we perceive change.
Defending neo-Lorentzian presentism, Dean Zimmerman claims that physics does not actually rule out an absolute present. On the other hand, Huw Price argues that physics does not support it and that the flow of time is just a psychological illusion. The truthmaker problem is another challenge for presentism, as noted by Kristie Miller, especially Paul Davies, who argues that eternalism is the better explanation of time under relativity.
But what about religious and theological views on presentism? Numerous Christian theologians are inclined toward eternalism, thinking that God lives above term. Scholars like Augustine and Boethius greatly affected this picture. Thomas Aquinas last raised on it, stating that for God, the past, present, and future are all components of one augmented truth. Nevertheless, some Christian practices are better presentist, claiming that God’s understanding increases with period and that just the present very lives.
Buddhist philosophy emphasizes impermanence (anicca), claiming that only the present moment is accurate and that people should focus on it rather than being caught up in the illusions of the past or future, an idea reinforced by mindfulness (sati). However, some Mahāyāna Buddhist perspectives reject permanent temporal distinctions. In contrast, Islamic thinkers like Al-Ghazali and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) viewed time as an independent entity.
Both eternalism and divine presentism can find support in the Quran, which suggests that God perceives time differently from humans. For instance, Surah Al-Hajj (22:47) states that “a day in the sight of Allah is like a thousand years” for humans. Similarly, Hindu philosophy often challenges both rigid presentism and eternalism, portraying time as cyclical (kalachakra). In Advaita Vedanta, time is considered an illusion (maya).
Recent studies in neuroscience and cognitive science explore how people perceive time and whether presentism aligns with human thought processes. According to neuroscientists, our perception of time is a product of brain activity. David Eagleman suggests that our sense of an ongoing present is an illusion because the brain processes experience in short intervals (about 80 milliseconds). Time might not actually “flow” but instead be consciously reconstructed.
Research by Endel Tulving shows that memory works as a fragmented reconstruction, implying that the past is just a mental process that only exists in the present. Andy Clark takes this further, arguing that our perception of time is more about expectations than objective reality, as the brain is constantly predicting the future based on past experiences. It raises a big question: Can a fully presentist reality even exist if our brains are always thinking about both the past and the future?
The debate between eternalism and presentism gets even more complicated when you consider that different civilizations have different perspectives on time. Western philosophy, influenced by Christianity and Greek thought, tends to see time as linear. However, in many Indigenous cultures, like the Maya, Hopi, and Aboriginal traditions, time is seen as cyclical, where the past, present, and future are interconnected rather than separate.
In some Taoist traditions in China, time is viewed as something fluid and changeable. Anthropologist Edward T. Hall classified civilizations as either polychronic or monochronic. Presentism aligns more with monochronic cultures, which emphasize punctuality and strict schedules. On the other hand, polychronic cultures (where time is seen as flexible) challenge both rigid presentist and eternalist frameworks.
In the digital world, past events have a kind of permanent existence because they are continuously preserved and instantly accessible. Digital records ensure that past exchanges, conversations, and actions remain available, unlike classical presentism, which argues that the past disappears. The idea that only the present is real gets shaky when an old social media post from ten years ago resurfaces as if it were still there.
Through virtual reality, users can also interact with predictions of the future or even step into simulations of past events. However, does experiencing a simulation of the past make it real, even for a moment? Virtual reconstructions of history (like taking a VR tour of ancient Rome) create immersive worlds where historical events no longer feel nonexistent. Meanwhile, AI systems continuously analyze historical data to predict future trends; in other words, they function based on the very things presentism denies.
Historical data remains relevant because large language models like ChatGPT process past inputs and generate responses based on learned historical information. If digital technology allows us to relive or predict past and future events accurately, do those events actually exist? It raises the issue of mathematical truths, like numbers and geometric shapes, which exist beyond the present moment and outside of time altogether.
Take the Pythagorean theorem or the number 2; both exist independently of the present. The equation 2 + 2 = 4 was true in ancient Greece, is true now, and will always be accurate in the future. Presentism and Platonism do not really go together since Platonism argues that mathematical objects exist in an eternal, abstract realm. Nominalism might fit better with presentism, but it struggles to explain how mathematical facts remain consistent over time.
The laws of physics are also described through mathematical structures. For example, are Newton’s laws of motion timeless? They applied in the 17th century, still apply today, and will continue to apply in the future. Presentism’s claim that the past does not exist runs into problems here, mainly since legal systems rely on the assumption that past actions still matter and can be enforced.
Even though the moment of signing is no longer “present” in a strict presentist view, legally binding contracts signed in the past still impose obligations on people. The legal system operates as if past events still exist in some way. To punish crimes, we have to assume that past actions (despite no longer existing) still carry meaning. Years after a murder, the murderer can still be arrested.
Courts base their present and future rulings on legal precedents. When deciding on modern cases, the U.S. Supreme Court refers to constitutional interpretations that go back centuries, implying that past legal reasoning still exists in some form. In this way, presentism has to account for the legal system’s assumption that past agreements and actions still hold weight in the present, even if it does not explicitly acknowledge it.
The way time is explored in different artistic genres both supports and challenges presentism. Some literary genres focus heavily on immediacy. Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway uses a stream-of-consciousness approach to minimize the separation between past and future, immersing the reader in the character’s present mental state. Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot highlights an existential present where the past and future are either lost or meaningless.
On the other hand, some works challenge presentism by portraying time as cyclical, fragmented, or coexisting. Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five presents an eternalist or block-universe view of time, following Billy Pilgrim as he experiences every moment of his life simultaneously. Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude resists the rigid separation of time found in presentism, instead blending past, present, and future into a nonlinear experience.
Some films also reflect presentism by showing events as if they are happening in real time. Alexander Sokurov’s Russian Ark, filmed in one continuous shot, emphasizes an unbroken present without clear divisions between past and future. Meanwhile, other films promote an eternalist or block-universe view of time by depicting it as something more complex. Denis Villeneuve’s Arrival explores linguistic relativity and nonlinear time perception. Christopher Nolan’s Interstellar illustrates time dilation within Einstein’s theory of relativity.
While strict presentism argues that only the present is real, literature and film often depict time as flexible, fragmented, or nonlinear. Presentism is also heavily challenged by quantum mechanics. Until they are measured, quantum systems do not have definite characteristics, just like Schrödinger’s cat, which is both alive and dead at the same time. The double-slit experiment raises doubts about a single fixed reality, showing that particles behave both as waves and particles before they are observed.
Quantum entanglement also contradicts presentism. Two entangled particles can instantly affect each other even when separated by vast distances. Since there is no single “present moment” that applies to all observers, this directly conflicts with classical presentism. While presentism struggles to explain a global “now,” eternalism allows for superposition and entanglement across different temporal states. Ultimately, presentism is in direct opposition to Einstein’s theory of relativity.
It is hard to define a universal “present” because what seems simultaneous to one observer might not be for another. The fact that two astronauts moving at different speeds would experience different present moments shows that time is a continuum. If the universe started with the Big Bang and time has been unfolding ever since, does that mean the present is constantly moving forward?
What feels like “now” for someone in a strong gravitational field is different from what feels like “now” for someone farther away, thanks to gravitational time dilation (which slows time drastically near a black hole). Interstellar makes the idea of a single present even more complicated by showing how someone closer to a black hole experiences time much more slowly than someone farther away.
If only the present exists, where does the past go? Does it just vanish into nothingness, or does it somehow remain unseen but still shape the fabric of our fleeting existence? And what about the future? Is it just a void, something yet to unfold, or merely an illusion, our brain’s way of tricking us into believing time moves forward?
Presentism, which asserts that only the present is natural, is appealingly no-frills. Yet, in a world where recollections last, digital atoms never completely fade, and physics questions the concept of an unmarried “now,” we have to wonder: Do we indeed arrive at this point, or are we floating through something completely separate? If the term is only a scheme of perception, is the present anything better than a fantasy we prefer to think in?
References
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- Miller, K. (2013). Presentism, Eternalism and the Growing Block. In A. Bardon (Ed.), The Future of the Philosophy of Time (pp. 54–75). Routledge.
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- Zimmerman, D. W. (2011). Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold. In C. Callender (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time (pp. 163–244). Oxford University Press.
