Discontinuity in History: Foucault’s Genealogical Method

Michel Foucault, known for his ideas on the resurgence of undercut lawfulness, was born in Poitiers, France, on October 15, 1926. He was intelligent but struggled psychologically as a student. Foucault became academically established in the 1960s and held various positions at French universities. In 1969, he joined the prestigious Collège de France, where he became a Professor of the History of Systems of Thought until his death.

Foucault was also politically active in the 1970s and founded the Prison Information Group, often advocating for fringe groups. He passed away in Paris on June 25, 1984, becoming an early victim of AIDS. Foucault’s academic background was in psychology, history, and philosophy, and people often debated whether he should be considered a philosopher. His books primarily focus on the history of medical and social sciences, with strong interests in literature and politics.

Many people read Foucault’s works philosophically in various ways. Either they engage in the traditional critical project of philosophy but in a new way, or they critically engage with the ideas of conventional philosophers.

Using his archaeological approach, Foucault describes it as an exploration into the resurgence of undercut lawfulness, focusing on specific historical conditions. It involves a combined statement that informs and describes a field of knowledge while requiring a particular set of concepts. Historical changes in objects are not explained from the same perspective, as discourse is always discontinuous.

Archaeology does not focus on finding continuity. Prehistory does not determine thoughts or images, nor does it dictate where thought appears in discourse. Foucault’s archaeology does not seek continuity or uncover established figures. It looks at the anonymous moments in history, especially in the context of psychological and sociological development.

Foucault used an archaeological approach to study the origins of human science, dividing European history into three periods: the Renaissance, the classical period, and the modern era.

Foucault rejected all forms of global speculation and avoided giving a complete critical analysis of systematization. His work is coherent despite not forming a system. He was influenced by Nietzsche’s vision of history, particularly his genealogical approach, which is evident in Foucault’s work, even though Foucault did not follow Nietzsche’s approach exactly. Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality attempts to challenge the legitimacy of the present by distancing it from the past.

Foucault’s approach was not different from that of historians who try to trace the inevitability of history. Instead, he separated the past from the present, showing the alienation of the past to revitalize and question the legitimacy of the present. His genealogical approach aims to trace the formation of epistemes—not to find origins but to dig into their depths, seeking the foundation of truth in each period of thought.

It’s also not a theory but more of a way to examine and dismantle episteme and social practices. Michel Foucault can’t escape critical description because they replace and complement each other in the resurgence of undercut lawfulness. The key part of his analysis relates to the entire system of discourse spheres, trying to figure out the principles behind structuring and the irregularities in discourse.

The genealogical side is closely linked to a series of effective formations that protect themselves based on the power of their affirmations. Power creates areas where each domain can affirm the truth or falsehood of a statement. Genealogy aims to continue anthropology, focusing on the scope of discursive practices and discovering the origin of thought without relating it to a lost or essential identity.

In this way, Foucault shows that history has been a history of distortion—not a history of language or meaning, but of relationships between powers. In one of his essays, he talks about a discursive formation that forms a regime of power over truth, which was once seen as natural. It cannot be separated from, or free from, the limitations and control of non-discursive formations.

The main point is that discourse is dangerous, and power tries to control it. Foucault defines the domains where this control is problematic—like politics, desire, madness, and the balance between right and wrong.

In addition to drawing heavily from Nietzsche, Foucault, besides discussing the resurgence of undercut lawfulness, rejected science for science’s own sake. It is not about power; it is about madness, politics, or sexuality—anything that leads to control. In management, this can be repressive, and sometimes even oppressive, where the domination between subject and object justifies each other.

Power creates subjective truth involving knowledge, whereas reality becomes disciplinary. Foucault concluded that every society has its identity politics. For him, no form of proficiency ever transcends the regime of truth and power itself. Every form of knowledge is tied to specific socio-historical contexts, temporary, and never turns into objective, universal truths.

So, postmodernism represents a universe without fixed points. There is no central point or universal standard for measuring, judging, or evaluating concepts. Foucault’s idea of replacing the universality of modernism with multi-versatility—accepting and acknowledging diversity in society—is an example of this.

Foucault rejects the Hegelian model, where one mode of production flows dialectically into another. Instead, he follows Nietzsche’s tactic of proposing differences, starting from the present and moving backward in time to find differences. Then, Foucault moves forward again, tracing the process of transformation while maintaining both discontinuity and continuity. Foucault’s method of alienating discourse or practices is a critique of the present’s rationality, which he sees as blown up.

When the power dynamics of the past are described in detail, the assumptions of the past view history as an irrational collapse. The gap between the past and the present highlights the principle of difference, which is central to Foucault’s historiography. He leaves the idea of disruption vague, and many post-mortem texts simplify things to evolutionist conclusions, which goes against the genealogy of difference.

Genealogical analysis is different from traditional, unidirectional forms of research. Traditional history, on the other hand, organizes events into large, scattered systems and linear processes. It celebrates specific events and figures, trying to document their origins. Genealogy, however, aims to establish the singularity of events and often downplays the spectacular ones in favor of the trivial ones.

According to Foucault, history is denied when knowledge is suppressed or reduced to insufficient knowledge. Naive understanding lies at the bottom of the hierarchy of command outside of scientific understanding. Foucault often uses the term “genealogy” to refer to the connection between intellectual knowledge and local memories, which helps humans build historical knowledge about life’s struggles.

Instead of focusing on knowledge used in everyday life, genealogy zooms in on local knowledge, challenging the unified claims of theories, hierarchical ordering, and organization in the name of actual knowledge. Foucault, like Nietzsche, reverses the general view of the relationship between knowledge and power. Many philosophers and scholars believe that knowledge gives the ability to act but cannot make independent decisions.

Foucault argued that knowledge is the power to dominate others. It is no longer liberating; it becomes a tool for control, regulation, and discipline. Foucault focused on times when surveillance became more efficient and profitable.

In Discipline and Punish, he examines how obedience to specific punishments changed in the 18th century, closely linked to the creation of new models of power. He starts with descriptions of torture and execution, showing how these practices significantly changed over eight years. Torture faded, replaced by the regulation of prisoners and new monitoring systems like barracks, prisons, and schools.

Foucault believed that power does not control everything; it mainly serves economic interests, and power is not just about ownership or ability. He emphasized that power relations do not come from rulers or the state but from individuals or classes, and they need to be conceptualized. Analyzing power should not focus on something other than conscious goals but on how power is exercised.

Power is spread throughout society in a network. Foucault shifts the focus from questions about who holds power to the goals of those in power.

In his thinking, Foucault, apart from talking about new things and often seeming foreign by defining formation and positivity, took a unique approach to history, different from most historians. He looked at history critically from a micro perspective and redefined it, emphasizing the idea of discontinuity. For him, history was not just a series of events flowing from one point to the next.

Every event, in his view, involves discontinuity, unlike traditional historians who write history from a more continuous perspective. History, for Foucault, is something necessary for understanding the present, not just a recounting of past events. Along with his visionary thinking and the generation of new ideas, Foucault dared to step out of his comfort zone, accepting all the risks or consequences that came with it. Few people would call this imbalance, but it is something real and urgent that requires the touch and persistence of philosophers or historians.

His dedication is clear in studying taboo topics like prisons and sexual deviance. While people often see science objectively, they tend to have taboo views about forms of discrimination influenced by power and tradition. Foucault believed every discourse has the same potential and is part of knowledge that everyone should have access to.

Foucault also rejects the idea that power’s origin is in structures or institutions at the top. Instead, he questions the traditional concept of conflict between the business class and the lower class. He argues that the bourgeoisie doesn’t create techniques or mechanisms of power, nor do they form a class by exercising direct control. However, the spread of power does show political and economic benefits for the bourgeoisie.

Seeing power only as an oppressor or a barrier is not enough to understand how it shapes reality. Power, for Foucault, creates domains of objects and rituals of truth, and he argues that power drives people to insanity. Society needs to recognize that power creates and gives birth to new objects of knowledge. Knowledge produces the effects of power, and without knowledge of power, it is impossible to bring power into being.

References

• Foucault, M. (1970). The Archaeology of Knowledge. Pantheon Books.
• Foucault, M. (1975). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books.
• Foucault, M. (1980). The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction. Pantheon Books.