The Paradoxical Rise of Spinoza in Modernity
In academic circles, the paradox that foreshadowed Baruch Spinoza’s rise in modernity is now well known. Moses Mendelssohn aimed to give Spinoza new credibility by bringing him closer to the philosophical theories of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff, as well as Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s attempt to condemn him as heterodox and thereby exclude him from the contemporary Christian fold once and for all, both failed. to achieve their common goal of restoring Spinoza’s heterodoxy. Situated within a particular mode of philosophical crisis, the Mendelssohn-Jacobi debate highlights the intricacies of Spinoza’s reception and its relevance in the intellectual milieu of the time.
The discussions create a conceptual environment that gives rise to reinterpreted Spinozistic archetypes, which can relieve the spiritual tension caused by the zeitgeist and launch a fresh methodical inquiry into the relationship between subject and nature, power and substance. As a result, Spinoza (who was once hated as a cursed person) experienced a revival as a representative of modernist ideas, especially in the context of Romantic philosophy.
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was a key figure in such matters, emerging victorious by accepting Spinoza’s understanding of nature as a possible way to reconcile the dialectical conflicts between history and reason, feeling and intelligence, and freedom and necessity. According to the case, Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe used Spinoza’s reconstructed objectivity as a solid foundation for building a vision of Romanticism full of depth and coherence, in contrast to the subjectivity and revolutionary spirit that characterized Sturm und Drang. As a result, Spinoza became more than just a Romantic symbol; it became the philosophical foundation of the movement, encapsulating its ethos of richness and fullness.
When confronted with nature in all its powerful splendor, the majesty of nature shows multifaceted manifestations that include heartbreaking tragedy and astounding displays of the power contained within. Such subtle interpretations highlight important aspects of the aesthetic appeal of Romanticism. First, Spinoza was received in this intellectual milieu essentially as an aesthetic experience in which the viewer was induced to notice the movement and perfect symmetry present in philosophical conversation, highlighting the concepts of movement, perfection, and the interaction of dynamic forms.
The appreciation of aesthetics remained even when the general conceptual framework and specific components of Romanticism became objects of philosophical analysis and inquiry. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (a famous representative of Romantic philosophy) viewed the philosophical system of Spinoza and Immanuel Kant as a very cohesive and intricately interwoven philosophical system, especially in the ongoing “I” ontological school. Meanwhile, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling quickly resolved the alleged radical split between dogmatic and critical philosophy in the 1790s, in particular the contrast between absolute philosophy as espoused by critical thought and dogmatic philosophical doctrines relating to absolute objects and Spinozism. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel immediately recognized the process: dialectical analysis, in which the weight of objectivity plays an important role as a reconciling force, produces reconciliation.
Contrary to any antinomian connotation, the absolute position of the “I” develops through an unstoppable and indispensable process that gives rise to the idea of “spiritual automatism” inherent in the reciprocal relationship between subject and substance over the realm of tragedy. The important development draws attention to the intrinsic elevation of the ontological relationship between the subjective self and the all-pervading universal essence.
Such an aesthetic aspect of synthesis is defined by its unflagging dedication to recovering substance and strength as well as productive components and modes of production, culminating in a state of perfection. Hegel claimed that Romanticism demonstrated a unique capacity to see beyond the objective nature of ideals and reveal the true nature of truth and beauty. First, it breaks the unity that exists between concept and reality, exposing the differences between the two and revealing ultimate subjectivity. Reestablishing objectivity is a process by which sensibility is resolved and the resulting absolute character is tempered. Although in line with Lessingian influences, such dialectical progress is expressed through well-articulated motivations and highlights the propaedeutic journey towards the absolute. In the framework, Spinoza is a key figure who made a major contribution to the development of complex processes.
Hegel’s integration of Spinozistic devices into Romanticism and the subsequent expression of dissonance shows that there was indeed dissonance at the stage. It is the result of a complex interaction between philosophical frameworks, where aesthetics and Romanticism (although important aspects of the world) inherently challenge absolutes, especially about modernity, historicity, and effectiveness. In particular, truth and reflection are lacking in Romanticism and aesthetics exhibiting an imbalance similar to Spinoza’s “being” and characterized by a lack of determination. Hegel’s relationship with Spinoza alternated between anguished rivalry and initial improvement; it is ultimately realized in the logical part, which is where confrontation and separation are fulfilled. The clarification of Hegel’s negative notion of “being” about Spinoza highlights the importance of the discourse in influencing philosophical ideas and had significant consequences for discussions of the ontology of modernity in the 20th century. It is important, therefore, to recognize the fundamental role it plays in more general philosophical inquiry even though the intricacies of the episode are so well explained.
There are two main paths taken by Hegel’s criticism. It begins by taking a phenomenological stance, concentrating on how to interpret Spinozian “modes.” Second, placing limits on the concept of determination as the love of substance defines itself as something other than substance and demands understanding as “other.” Hegel’s rejection of the mode was direct; he rejected it because it demands dialectical reflection as well as Nichtigkeit, or lack thereof. Hegel argued that Spinoza’s phenomenology was still very shallow because it was only based on the absolute. However, because the principle emphasizes complete self-preservation, the world of fashion in the frame is entangled in abstract uncertainty, without any observable differences. As a result, fading fashion became asymmetrical.
When we move from phenomenology to ontological evaluation, we see that the differences and inequalities that emerge in the world of fashion also extend to Spinoza’s general theory of “being.” According to Hegel, “being” cannot escape the ambiguity of fashion. The constitutive uncertainty inherent in “being” dissolves into reality itself, and is implicitly captured by the inherent indifference that characterizes the world of fashion. In Spinoza’s foundation, “being” is Dasein, which is inherently unresolved. According to Hegel, Spinoza’s substance is essentially determined by absolute indifference, which also contains a lack of reason for dialectical inversion. It is an empty totality that separates Spinoza’s substance, which represents absolute closure to determination within itself.
Hegel argued that Spinoza’s substance is “The cause, which by its self-existence resists all invasion, has become the need for submission or fate, and this submission is the most difficult. The need for significant power and freedom is the intuition of the most perfect substance in Spinoza, namely renunciation. of limited existence.”
In short, Hegel’s analysis of Spinoza’s content covers a variety of salient points. First of all, he sees it as an endless horizon of real and universal presence and thus recognizes the possibility of self-representation in it. Furthermore, he asserts that Spinoza’s substance has aesthetic potential, highlighting “character in itself.” Third, Hegel argues that Spinoza’s quality of substance is fundamentally incapable of fully expressing itself in reality and is thus unresolved in the dialectical process of true reconciliation. Consequently, Hegel claims that Spinoza’s notion of “being” is more Romantic than modern because it does not meet the requirements of modernity. Hegel argued that the broader impossibility of achieving modernity lay beyond dialectical impossibility while recognizing the indispensable nature of Spinoza for philosophy. He saw modernity as the achievement of historical fulfillment and true peace, which he felt Spinoza’s influence and authority were incapable of providing.
Temporality and Modernity
There is a cardinal point in the discussion of modernity that requires us to assess Hegel’s philosophical position about Spinoza, especially when it comes to temporality. According to Spinoza, time is defined as a duality: time can be understood as the infinite expanse of time it encompasses and the immediacy of presence. The latter, which is defined as having infinite duration, reflects the continuous efforts made by all entities to continue to exist. The idea that power implies limited time, thereby determining the duration of an entity, seems counterintuitive because it suggests the existence of an external cause and not an ultimate goal driven by an intrinsic essence. On the other hand, time as presence (meaning uniqueness and determination) implies a residual reduction of temporality to its essential meaninglessness. However, it simultaneously emerged as a fundamental ontological change. In such cases, the physical form, its material existence, and the soul attached to it are combined into a concept that represents the basic nature of the body from the standpoint of eternal truth.
Although somewhat ambiguous, Hegel departs from Spinoza’s explanation of time as infinite duration in current discourse. Hegel’s critique of infinite duration is both a rebuttal and a reframing of his more general critique of the indifference of modes of substance.
Hegel argued that the idea of the infinite is unavoidable, but he also emphasized the need to address the central issues that arise in the interaction between the infinite and the finite. Hegel argued that we need to go beyond the problem. For such reasons, duration needs to be changed and become a measure of quantity to quality. The infinite reaches its realization through this process. To avoid the theoretical destruction of Spinozian presence and keep it from turning into pure nothingness, Hegel’s bearing reduces temporal duration and abstract temporality to concrete and historical temporality.
Dasein and the Question of Being
In the scheme, dialectics plays a role in reversing the presence of reality and helps clarify what modernity is by concretizing time. Nevertheless, the second Spinozian definition (which views presence as the gateway to power from an eternal perspective) remains. Nevertheless, how can one disagree with Spinoza’s account of Dasein whose uniqueness is irreducible to Gewordensein and is in stark contrast to the determination of “being” in any synthetic dialectic?
When Hegel stated that the dialectical notion of temporality does not exclude concrete determination, he acknowledged the point of view. In other words, everything that happens, such as decisions, actions, and results, is kept concrete within a philosophical framework.
It is important to understand that in the scaffolding of modernity which is determined by the temporal essence of its fulfillment, actualization does not obscure or minimize the significance of overriding events. Despite its intrinsic richness and complexity, Hegel’s dialectical form completely refuses to surrender to the singularity that exists in the world. But associated with the dialectical interaction is a subtle but formidable challenge, based on an inherent ambiguity and inexplicability. When Spinoza’s philosophy is present, a strong ontology is presented—which is defined by an eternal and powerful essence that comes from the fabric of singularity and is not affected by annihilation.
Although he did so under the pretext of misleading, Hegel used subtle tactics to subvert power relations. He wants the power structure he claims to be fighting for restored. Hegel also criticizes Spinoza’s notion of “being” as a kind of violence because it inherently resists reduction, which pushes him towards non-existence and apathy. However, Hegel argued that whenever a single presence appears; reality shows itself to be filled with potential, positivity, and openness, rather than empty. By the same token, Hegel opposed the transcendental and repetitive character of theoretical time frames burdened by definite presence because he was dissatisfied with the idea that time has infinite duration. When modernity’s understanding of time is contrasted with the emergence of the singularity (best represented by the positive temporal framework of Dasein and Spinozian presence) the difference becomes even more apparent.
Hegel’s ideas about modernity emerged as a complex interaction between different philosophical ideas. He was motivated to clarify the ambiguities underlying his theory, which was a necessary task due to the significant impact of transcendental mediation on the emergence of the singularity. However, according to Hegel, there is a fundamental weakness in the transcendental attempt to absorb a single energy—one that prevents a just absorption from occurring.
Defined by terms such as “acosmic” and “atemporal,” Spinoza’s philosophical position articulates a view of time as a singularity and presence that is ultimately subsumed within the great dialectical apparatus. However, Spinoza’s efforts were not fully realized. In this context, modernity not only opposes Romanticism but also represents the unfulfilled ambition to harness the generative potential of the singularity. Despite the aggravation, recurring patterns do not contradict themselves; rather, they determine the boundaries of domination.
Modernity is seen through Hegel’s eyes as a symbol of transcendental domination of power, representing a continuous effort to control power through the rational use of instruments of power. As a result, a dual relationship emerges that both unites and separates Hegel and Spinoza. Hegel prefers mediation and the dialectic of transcendental power, while Spinoza places power in intimacy and singularity. Notwithstanding, the two philosophers sought to achieve a state of full and productive presence. Spinoza and Hegel’s conception of presence differs in comparison. While Hegel’s modernity embodies the opposite option, Spinoza rejects modernity because it involves a reduction that leads to Dasein rather than a denial of reality.
The modern environment is defined by a dialectical composition that combines the concepts of interiority and exteriority and represents the fundamental relationship between inherent nature and external manifestations. Characterized by the unification of existence and essence, the ontological synthesis has been a source of keen philosophical debate that has persisted in critical philosophy for nearly 200 years.
The ideas of substance and potential underwent an intense metamorphosis throughout the height of philosophical inquiry, which was most visible in the golden age of German thought and even more so in the silver age that followed. The 19th century was marked by vigorous “criticism of criticism” and culminated in grand fin-de-siècle academic philosophy. In this place, Wirklichkeit and Dasein merge into an inseparable whole that transcends their previous binary existence.
First and foremost, people often view power as an illogical, hostile force. In philosophical discourse, there is slow but steady progress toward the laudable project of eradicating irrationality and obfuscating forms of power. The harsh reality of crisis and tragedy first confronts Hegel’s desire to establish the dialectical hegemony of absolute substance. Furthermore, his activities take the form of an endless search to revitalize transcendental teleology through a dialectical framework in various fields. However, the quest is not without satirical interactions with major figures such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche, who consistently offer complex yet effective portraits of modernity. Rather than representing Hegel’s idea of an absolute utopia, the primacy of relations of production over productive forces is a reformist teleology. Schemes of infinite duration are perfected as a tactic of the progressive domination of rationality, as opposed to infinite dialectical processes. The arrival of modernity changed the external appearance without changing the fundamental framework. It maintains a difficult cycle in which the search for renewal requires a thorough investigation of various ways to avoid the dry, autocratic, and utopian refinement of Hegelian modernity, opting instead to impose more schematic forms of transcendentalism and rationalism. Such exhaustion creates a self-destructive cycle that forces one to reconsider the idea of modernity and its development.
Martin Heidegger represents the extreme part of this process, which strives for a smooth transition. If we take the reevaluation of the transcendental shell as one of the goals of Being and Time, such a process reaches a level of coherence. But when it returned to the traditional path, it also deviated from its original path and lost its initial momentum.
In the aforementioned essay, they aim to do two things: first, they want to clarify what is meant by Being; and second, they want to do it with real precision. For now, they want to interpret time as a general structure that allows for every possible interpretation of Being.
Yet it must be recognized that if their task is to understand the essence of Being, then Dasein appears not only as the main object of our inquiry but also as the Being that we imagine when we ask the question. In such circumstances, the question of Being becomes more than a philosophical puzzle; it is a radicalization of Dasein’s innate tendency towards true Being, a pre-ontological understanding of Being.
Resurfacing is the central theme of presence, where Dasein, at its core, represents a temporality marked by disintegration and reinvention, always existing as presence—a state endowed with steadiness and rootedness, independently negotiating sustained change and diffusion by the widespread influence of “them” and various forms of cultural disorientation. It is in the structure that fate becomes central, and history is placed under the plane of exchange and disappointment. Hegel’s efficacy underwent a major transformation, moving from its previous understanding as Wirklichkeit to a state of pure Faktizität. Thus, modernity and the idea of fate are closely intertwined.
Heidegger presents a unique existential perspective in the final section of Being and Time, deliberately departing from Hegel’s focus on mediation and absolute spirit. He argues that we must begin our critical examination of Dasein with concrete facts (immersed in facts) revealing temporality as the fundamental factor that makes concrete existence possible. Heidegger argued that “spirit” is in a primordial state and temporality is its derivative, in contrast to Hegel’s idea that “spirit” enters the temporal realm. Basically, “spirit” is not limited by time; rather, actual existence is in a state of “fall” and is driven by its origin from sterling and primordial temporality.
When temporality descends to the point where “being” becomes “attention,” it takes on the form of potentiality and forward-looking. In the domain, free from teleological and dialectical complications, temporality clarifies potentiality as Dasein’s fundamental ontological conclusion. Therefore, the only place where the realm of possibilities and the future can open again is when one faces fate. But the question remains: how can Dasein be authentic? The complex and gloomy world of death contains the greatest and most authentic potential of Dasein. But the potential also negates presence; it is the “possibility of the impossible,” evolving into the highest and purest potential of Dasein. In this way, the motif of Hegelian modernity ends: the direct convergence of essence and existence emerges in nothingness and death. Heidegger’s despair of Entschlossenheit (or the determination and resolution of Dasein’s openness to its truth) namely nothingness, is a transformation of Hegel’s pathetic appeal to Bestimmung. It ends the melody used to coordinate transcendental and deterministic dance rhythms.
Heidegger not only emerged as a prophet who predicted the direction of modernity, but he also played an important role in defining the anti-modern position. In the dual capacity, it creates important boundaries and turning points that support the idea that time is an ontologically constitutive relationship. Such the idea of breaking the hegemonic domination of the transcendental or material world opens the door to the actualization of power dynamics.
Resolution is more than just removing closure (Entschlossenheit); it is closely related to openness and anticipation. Such components form the essence of reality as seen in Dasein.
Being There
“Being there” is expressed in a way that outstrips the simple act of discovering (Entdecken) a pre-existing phenomenon; it is an active process of locating Dasein’s already invested autonomy within and against the influence of omnipresent anonymous social entities, also known as “they.”
As he draws boundaries, being there shows his innate openness, forming what is known as the vision of “Sicht.” But beyond perception, the transparency is the embodiment of foresight, or “Umsicht.” Potential is a manifestation of being there, but outdoes the idea of representing a strong “potential power.” As a group, “we” assume truth because we are anchored in Being through Dasein, and as such, we are “in truth.” However, Dasein is always present before itself (always forming a being whose existence is its essence) where its essence cannot be separated from the forces inherent in itself. The fundamental way of life and potential of Dasein as a being in the world is closely related to openness and exploration which also includes the integration of discoveries woven into the fabric of being in the world. The purest form of ascription is found in Dasein’s constitution as caring, in its projection beyond itself.
In scientific discourse, the notion of presence goes beyond mere existence; it not only signifies a condition of existence but also an expression of essence, a state of pure existence filled with holiness. In context, time is seen as a dynamic force that directs energy and influences productivity. Time has power even when it disappears; the ideas constitute the basis of Spinoza’s philosophical system and are represented by the term “tempus potentae.”
Spinoza’s central role in the philosophical conversation is to actualize what Heidegger only proposed as potential through his focus on essence. Distinguishing itself from Hegelian metaphysics, Spinoza’s ontology emphasizes the dominance of presence through the conflict between emptiness and abundance that permeates Heideggerian thought. Contrary to the traditional modernist paradigm, Spinoza reframes time as an intrinsically positive and infinite concept and distances it from the search for fulfillment through the existence or absence of others.
Love and the Perfection of Presence
Love operates under similar conditions but takes a different role in the ontological framework than Heidegger’s concept of “care”, which embodies a transformative force that redefines human existence.
Methodically, Heidegger’s basic construction is reversed by Spinoza through a series of contradictions: where Heidegger examines Angst (anxiety), Spinoza balances it with Amor; Umsicht (foresight) meets its antithesis in Mens; Entschlossenheit (resolution) meets its antithesis in Cupiditas; Anwesenheit (presence) faces Conatus; Besorgen (worry) challenges Appetite; Mölichkeit (possibly) contrasts sharply with Potentia. Spinoza’s rejection of teleology unites presence and possibility in dialectical interaction and unites different ontological orientations. At the same time, the ambiguous nature of existence is interpreted clearly: Heidegger’s path leads to nothingness, while Spinoza’s orientation leads to fullness. Viewing the present as complete, the Spinozian paradigm provides a solution to the Heideggerian puzzle of oscillating in the void. Although Heidegger and Spinoza grant autonomy to the presence of capital or phenomenological entities, Spinoza departs from Heidegger’s view by recognizing entities as agents of productive potential.
The dialectical movement towards existential emptiness, or (towards the generative drive inherent in presence) is revealed through a reduction in temporal duration resulting in the emergence of a state of presence. Emerging from the same philosophical horizon, the dualistic trajectory distinguishes two basic orientations: Heidegger engages critically with the ethos of modernity, while Spinoza, considered outside the ethos of modernity, embodies an irreconcilable anti-modernistic potential and continues to push himself into the philosophy of time continuum modernity.
According to Spinoza’s philosophy, love is the manifestation of the presence and the expression of temporal potential with its parts woven into an eternal fabric. The perceptive eye can see the fine lines of the conceptual drawing process even in the labyrinth-like complexity of the fifth book’s introduction to Ethics. It describes the formal conditions necessary for the harmony of presence and eternity. The argument is followed up, which states that understanding the mind sub-specie aeternitatis depends on a deeper understanding of the essence of the body disguised as immortality, rather than simply recognizing the empirical existence of the body.
The propositions offer additional clarification regarding the origins of God’s intellectual love. He claims that passionate intellectual engagement with God arises from the interaction of three different types of knowledge. It is the combined result of the knowledge, that love brings happiness along with the idea that God is its causal agent (Love of God) but only to the extent that love is understood as something eternal, as opposed to love as a temporary presence. He believes that it is the essence of intellectual love for God.
Eternity is the formal aspect of presence; it is an eternal essence that exists beyond temporal boundaries. The idea clarifies the idea of a timeless life, in which eternal essence survives beyond successive times.
“Even though God’s love has no beginning, everything still has the perfection of Love, as if it existed,” is a contrast that highlights deep philosophical thoughts about the nature of divine love. Here, the wholeness and perfection inherent in divine love are not diminished by the lack of a temporal origin. On the contrary, it highlights how love is infinite and eternal, its essence does not change even without a temporary beginning.
We are warned not to fall victim to the misconception that equates eternity with duration. To explain the cautious position, it is pointed out that people mistakenly associate the eternal nature of the mind with its temporal duration, which is a common misconception. Such erroneous interpretations lead people to ascribe the qualities of memory or imagination that they think persist after death to the indestructible nature of the mind.
By the statement, the proposition outlines the close relationship between the mind’s love and its natural actions. Love takes the form of active contemplation in which the mind understands God as the ultimate cause and sees itself as the divine. Consequently, the love of the mind is intertwined with the infinite love through which God sees Himself, emphasizing His unbreakable bond with the divine essence.
It also becomes clear that the source of salvation, grace, and freedom is God’s unending and infinite love, namely, God’s love for humans. The statement is supported by the idea that love because it cannot be separated from God, brings happiness. Thus, eternal and blissful love flowing from the divine essence is the ultimate source of salvation and deliverance.
It states that there is a direct relationship between personal perfection and agency. It is said that higher levels of perfectionism are associated with more activity and less susceptibility to outside influences. On the other hand, increased activity drives greater accuracy. The argument suggests that agency and perfectionism have a mutually reinforcing relationship in which each enhances the other. Thus, it implies a dynamic interaction between personal agency and level of achievement.
Claims about the power of time are based on the previously mentioned correlation. That is, the essence of temporal power is its harmony with eternity. The fundamental element of temporal power is the intrinsic act of presence and that occurs before temporal progress. Here, eternity is understood not as an abstract, eternal state but rather as the point at which temporal action reaches its peak and the assertion of agency emerges. Therefore, time is also the essence of abundance in love which is the essence of endless action.
Absence and Abundance
The idea of absence and Spinoza’s idea of abundance complement each other in Heidegger’s philosophical system, especially when it comes to the paradoxical character of eternity. The contradictory characteristic indicates the abundance that exists here and now and is accentuated by the unique beauty of each moment in time. In such cases, the intersection of scarcity and abundance illuminates the complex relationship between the persistence of personal agency and worldly existence.
Forbye, the claim that love is the spark that ignites modernity embodies a broader philosophical viewpoint regarding the motivations behind social progress. In the state of affairs, love manifests as a transformative force that led to the emergence of modernity through its innate ability to foster creativity, connectedness, and group aspirations. Love and modernity are closely related; they highlight the significant impact of affective phenomena on the course of human history and cultural development.
Love for God (pure and untainted by envy or envy) remains something that cannot be changed. On the other hand, the more we imagine people coming to God through the same channels of love, the greater the need for such love. Thus, a new dimension is added to Spinoza’s definition of anti-modernity. Within the parameters of his system, Spinoza coordinates the collective aspects of the productive forces. Similar to the ethos of individualistic modernity, Spinoza emphatically rejects any dimension beyond the collective constitutive development of humanity and achieves complete immanence within it. The statement is explained clearly in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. The first may be the only explanatory guide to understanding the ideological path that supports the propositions in Ethics, or, more precisely, to understanding the entire system that controls the constitutive movement of Intellectual love as a collective essence.
Intellectual love is a formal condition for socialization and is a structured aspect of it. Withal, the essential ontology of Intellectual love is reduced to communal development. Thus, intellectual love is a way to reveal the paradox of the multitude. In the backdrop, intellectual love reveals the real mechanism that directs society’s potential towards self-definition as a unity that embodies the highest political order: democratic power. On the other hand, modernity struggles against a fundamental inability to justify democracy. Democracy is continually seen as constrictive in the contemporary paradigm, thereby encouraging recontextualization as a type of transcendental democracy. In particular, Hegel’s absolutism makes clear the collective productive power or its dormant forms. As a result, a formal conception of democracy was produced. How can the material factors influencing collective production, communal desire, and instances of insurmountable singularity be included in the paradigmatic construct?
As currently understood, modernity transforms hierarchical relationships between entities. Such shifts are caused by cyclical procedures that emphasize the waxing and waning of presence over time. The shift represents a break from Spinoza’s theory, which states that the processes are seen as complete and eternally open, with total autonomy, absolute authority, and the path to emancipation characterizing the realm between fulfillment and openness.
Presence, Openness, and the Limits of Utopia
In Spinoza’s philosophy, the full integration of liberating potentialities into the realm of immediate presence facilitates the rejection of utopian ideals. Utopia encourages the expansion of presence through its constitutive protective function while presence asserts its dominance by establishing a realism that is at odds with utopian aspirations. In contrast to Hegel’s predictions, the infinite and active presence lives in harmony within the realm of total determination and uncontrolled autonomy. Nothing idealistic, nothing transcendental, and nothing half-baked can bridge the gap to freedom. Concepts of openness, incongruity, and the absolute are resolved and concluded in an environment that exists beyond them and can only be entered through a fresh expression of presence. Love is greater than its eternal essence, just as collectivity gives ultimate meaning to singularity.
Heidegger’s social phenomenology builds from the unique essence of human existence, negotiating the tension between the authenticity inherent in existential ways of being in the world and the inauthenticity inherent in worldly engagement. Heidegger takes a polemical stance towards the transcendental viewpoint within the framework, which is similar to Spinoza’s philosophical methodology. Yet despite the intellectual commonality, the vortex of the existential crisis of modernity never ceases to contract itself, revealing the enormous generative potential inherent in nothingness.
On the other hand, Spinozist love rises to celebrate the temporal horizon and transform it into a space of shared experience in the realm of determination and joy. Here, Spinoza makes a strong argument against modernity by presenting an analysis that views the productive forces of existence as transcending individuality and as ontologically embedded in the fabric of collective human experience.
A Counterpoint to Modernity
Hegel’s definition of the cycle of modernity describes a process in which the devaluation of power to the highest level of transcendence causes a crisis in relations of domination and initiates a phase characterized by the exorcism of power and the reduction of irrationality and absence. The point represents the end of the cycle. At its peak, Spinozism became a central figure in modern philosophical discourse. Spinozism has been a cornerstone of criticism of modernity throughout intellectual history. On the other hand, Spinozism promotes the idea that the body, love, and the collective subject are expressions of the power of presence. The theory of time derived from teleology is central to Spinoza’s philosophical structure. The fundamental idea became the basis for Spinozism to appear as a replacement catalyst in defining the parameters of modernity.
The condemnation of a particular era raises the following fundamental questions of a critical stance based on a radical rejection of the norms of modernity articulated through a restrictive “alternative” frame: Why? In the field of alternative paradigms, meditative discourse becomes a path to reconciliation. During the long process of developing his theory of modernity, Jürgen Habermas was never able to go beyond the surface. However, the story is not interesting enough to keep our minds engaged. Somewhere, the essence of Spinoza reappears; it represents the site of the primordial rupture that sparked modernity. The schism marks the division between absolute and personal uniqueness, between authority and intermediary structures, and between productive capacity and relations of production. It does not offer an alternative path away from modernity; rather, it is a strongly anti-modernist and progressive position.
Contemporary writers have highly praised their interpretations of Spinoza’s anti-modernity. For example, Louis Althusser stated categorically that Spinoza’s philosophy sparked a theoretical revolution unprecedented in the history of philosophy, perhaps the greatest philosophical revolution ever. The declaration emphasizes the idea that Spinoza was the only direct predecessor of Marx.
Spinoza is the founder of a school of philosophy that defines authentic absolute praxis as having no teleological basis. The idea is based on his theory that existence arises from a cause within an effect and that the structural structure of existence unfolds within its effective form. To explain the view, Spinoza argued that everything is determined entirely by its effects, and that structure exists only in the domain of its effects. Thus, Spinoza’s theory of being emphasizes irreducible cause and effect and proposes an ontological scenario in which presence and structure are intertwined in the unfolding fabric of existence.
Foucault’s Reinterpretation
Contrary to Spinoza’s philosophical articulations, Michel Foucault found in Spinoza’s work a potential for transformation regarding the concept of structure. To explain the idea, Foucault draws attention to Spinoza’s tendency to reinterpret the originality of structure without providing a clear explanation of the processes underlying the creation of norms. According to him, the creation of norms depends on the group’s interaction with the structures that underlie existence; the idea of collective presentation is fundamental to Foucault’s interpretation. According to Foucault, collective complicity places the question of collective engagement over doctrinal or traditional adherence, and that profoundly changes the epistemological landscape.
According to Foucault, Spinoza’s philosophical discoveries also required a radical reorganization of the ontological inquiry into what it means to live in the modern era. The reconfiguration replaces differential examination of one’s affiliation with a particular collective consciousness with conventional concerns of doctrinal allegiance or common belonging to the larger human community. In a way, Foucault emphasizes the existential dilemma that people face when they find themselves reflected in themselves. As a result, Foucault draws a philosophical terrain in which the analysis of current reality takes center stage.
In short, the convergence of Foucault’s philosophical hermeneutics and Spinoza’s ontological insights results in a dialectical engagement with the nature of existence, normativity, and subjective experience. In the broader context of modern thought, the discourse emerges as a key component of modern philosophical inquiry.
Action, Change, and the Reinterpretation of Anti-Modernity
Taking a stance that challenges the conventional understanding of modernity as an inevitable outcome, Foucault introduces the notion of a “political history of truth” or a “political economy” of the desire for knowledge. It illustrates the contingent nature of modernity and the agency inherent in its construction. Rather than focusing solely on effectiveness, Gilles Deleuze positions Spinoza as a catalyst for action in the present. In the schema, individual subjects materialize as collective entities all within a domain of infinite possibilities that are constantly changing. As a result, anti-modernity became a dynamic framework in modern historiography, reinterpreted as a means of achieving collective emancipation, a symbol of corporeality and immortality, finitude and transcendence, and the return of limitless possibilities. So, in the paradigmatic shift, res gestae embodies the praxis of historical theory.
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